Systemic risk is an issue of great concern in modern financial markets as well as, more broadly, in the management of complex systems. We propose an axiomatic framework for systemic risk. Our framework allows for an independent specification of (1) a functional of the crosssectional profile of outcomes across agents in the system in a single scenario of nature, and (2) a functional of the profile of aggregated outcomes across scenarios of nature. This general class of systemic risk measures captures many specific measures of systemic risk that have recently been proposed as special cases, and highlights their implicit assumptions. Moreover, the systemic risk measures that satisfy our conditions yield decentralized decompositions, i.e., the systemic risk can be decomposed into risk due to individual agents. Furthermore, one can associate a shadow price for systemic risk to each agent that correctly accounts for the externalities of the agent's individual decision-making on the entire economy.
Introduction
Systemic risk refers to the risk of collapse of an entire complex system, as a result of the actions taken by the individual component entities or agents that comprise the system. The measurement and management of systemic risk is of fundamental importance in many business and engineering domains. The manager of a diversified firm has to assess and control the collective risk of all individual divisions or business units. The manager of a supply chain network is interested in the overall risk associated with a complex network of suppliers and sub-contractors. The manager of an electric power distribution network is interested in the aggregate risk of the generating stations, transmission facilities, and other entities in the network. As highlighted by the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] , one example of particular interest is the measurement and regulation of systemic risk of an economy or a financial market. While our methods are general and we seek to develop an understanding of systemic risk management broadly, in this paper, we focus on this LAST case and use the language of financial markets to present our work.
Fundamentally, the study of systemic risk in a financial market involves the simultaneous analysis of outcomes across all entities (firms) in the economy. On the other hand, much of the academic literature on the theoretical foundations for the measurement and estimation of risk, as well as the main regulatory standards for risk, have been focused on the study of individual firms in isolation.
We seek to bridge this gap by developing an axiomatic framework for a broad class of systemic risk measures.
Specifically, we are interested in an approach to systemic risk that is based on the analysis of the joint distribution of profits and losses across all firms in the economy and states of nature.
We consider systemic risk from the perspective of a regulator, who wishes to express a preference over sets of possible distributions of outcomes for the entire economy. One approach to defining a systemic risk measure is to apply a traditional, single-firm risk measure such as value-at-risk or conditional value-at-risk to the distribution of the total profits and losses for all firms in the economy (e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009; Acharya et al., 2010a; Tarashev et al., 2010) .
This approach treats the entire economy as a portfolio consisting of the constituent firms, and the regulator as a portfolio manager. However, the portfolio approach suffers from a number of modeling shortcomings. It implicitly allows the netting of profits and losses across the portfolio components. This is reasonable from the perspective of the manager of an investment portfolio. However, such netting may be undesirable from the perspective of a systemic regulator who, typically, is not able to directly cross-subsidize different firms with distinct ownership interests. Moreover, by considering only the total outcome, the portfolio approach lacks the modeling flexibility to accommodate preferences over the cross-sectional distribution of losses in an economy. For example, the regulator may have views on whether it is preferable for a single firm to have a large loss, or many firms to have small losses.
Motivated by these concerns, we define a broad class of systemic risk measures that can accommodate a rich set of regulatory preferences. We seek a generalization of the axiomatic characterizations for single-firm risk measures that have been developed in the literature; see, e.g., the coherent risk measures of Artzner et al. (1999) . The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We provide an axiomatic framework for defining systemic risk. We consider systemic risk as a functional on the joint distribution of outcomes across firms in an economy and scenarios (states of nature). As in the case of coherent risk measures for a single firm, we assume the monotonicity and positive homogeneity of systemic risk. Besides the usual notion of convexity, we introduce a new risk convexity concept for situations where outcomes are not directly combined. Additionally, we assume a preference consistency condition relating to the interactions between different firms across scenarios. The latter condition is novel and fundamentally specific to systemic risk; it has no analog among the typical conditions for single-firm risk measures, and it becomes trivial if the economy consists of a single firm. Our framework includes many recently proposed systemic risk measures as special cases, including, for example, measures based on the portfolio approach (e.g., Acharya et al., 2010a; Tarashev et al., 2010) and measures based on deposit insurance (e.g., Lehar, 2005; Huang et al., 2009 ).
• We provide a structural decomposition of systemic risk.
We demonstrate that any systemic risk measure satisfying our definition can be characterized by two independent components: (1) an aggregation function that expresses a preference over the cross-sectional profile of outcomes across firms in a single scenario, and (2) a base risk measure, similar to existing single-firm risk measures, that expresses a preference over the profile of aggregated outcomes across scenarios of nature. This decomposition provides a clear structural characterization of systemic risk, and suggests a well-defined procedure to construct such risk measures by choosing constituent aggregation functions and base risk measures. This decomposition highlights the power of the preference consistency condition.
• We provide a dual representation of systemic risk and shadow prices for systemic risk.
We show that any systemic risk measure can be expressed as the worst-case expected loss over a family of distributions over scenarios of nature and the cross-sectional profiles of firms, a generalization of the dual representation for single-firm coherent risk measures. In many cases, this representation provides operational benefits by permitting decentralized computation of systemic risk by the firms in the economy. Moreover, we show that the dual variables are in fact shadow prices for systemic risk: they represent the marginal increase in systemic risk as a function of a marginal increase in the loss of a particular firm in a particular scenario.
• We provide a mechanism for systemic risk attribution.
In our setting, the dual representation provides a mechanism for risk attribution. The total systemic risk can always be apportioned across the constituent firms in a way that satisfies a 'no-undercut' condition: the systemic risk allocated to any subset of the firms is no more than the systemic risk those firms would face as a stand-alone economy. Our allocation rule is a generalization of Aumann-Shapley prices for the fair allocation of costs or the Euler allocation rule for allocating the capital requirements of a portfolio across constituent subportfolios (Denault, 2001; Buch and Dorfleitner, 2008) .
• We provide a decentralized scheme to align individual incentives with the regulator.
We show that the risk attribution can properly account for the externalities imposed on the system when making decisions involving risk. Specifically, through a taxation scheme, the objective of the regulator can be aligned with the incentives of individual firms. Here, each individual firm maximizes the difference between its individual utility function and a tax payment that is derived from the firm's contribution to the systemic risk.
• Our methodology extends to broader classes of risk measures.
The structural decomposition of a systemic risk function into an aggregation function and a base risk measure follows from the preference consistency condition, and therefore, can be extended to broader classes of risk measures. In Section 6, we consider homogeneous systemic risk measures. These are systemic risk measures that are positively homogeneous and monotonic, but not necessarily convex. We show that homogeneous systemic risk measures that satisfy preference consistency can be decomposed into a single-firm homogeneous base risk measure and a homogeneous aggregation function. We describe a risk attribution scheme for a special class of piecewise linear homogeneous systemic risk measures that is a generalization of Aumann-Shapley prices. Similarly, a convex, monotonic, but not necessarily positively homogeneous system risk measure that satisfies preference consistency can also be decomposed into a convex monotonic single-firm risk measure and a convex monotonic aggregation function.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.1, we review the relevant literature. In Section 2, we provide an axiomatic definition of a systemic risk measure. In Section 2.1, we describe the structural decomposition of systemic risk, and in Section 2.2 we discuss a number of examples of systemic risk measures. In Section 3, we construct primal and dual variational representations for systemic risk measures. In Section 4, we discuss a systemic risk attribution scheme. We demonstrate a decentralized framework for systemic risk management in Section 5. In Section 6, we present extensions of our theory to homogeneous systemic risk measures. Finally, future directions for research are discussed in Section 7. Proofs are provided in the Online Supplement.
Literature Review
Our work parallels the axiomatic approach to single firm risk measures introduced by Artzner et al. (1999) . Schied (2006) provides a very good survey of the extensive literature on coherent and convex risk measures for a single firm. Unlike the single-firm case, we consider a system or economy that consists of multiple components of firms. Thus, some of the axioms for systemic risk measures are novel and different from those of single-firm risk measures, while other axioms address similar concerns.
Our approach to systemic risk involves analysis of a reduced-form model that is specified by the the joint distribution of profits and losses across all firms in the economy. In this setting, a number of authors analyze systemic risk by applying single-firm risk measures to a portfolio consisting of all firms in the economy (e.g., Gauthier et al., 2010; Tarashev et al., 2010) . Acharya et al.
(2010a) define a 'systemic expected shortfall' risk measure. As we shall see, their measure and their corresponding 'marginal expected shortfall' risk attribution rule fit in the spirit of our framework. Brownlees and Engle (2010) provide empirical results for the marginal expected shortfall metric. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) define a risk measure based on the value-at-risk of the economywide portfolio. An alternative reduced-form approach to systemic risk involves considering the price of deposit insurance or other credit insurance (e.g., Lehar, 2005; Huang et al., 2009 ). Giesecke and Kim (2011) consider a risk measure defined through the fraction of failed firms in the economy.
The general framework in this paper subsumes a number of these approaches. In Section 2, for example, we illustrate how systemic risk measures in the spirit of systemic expected shortfall or deposit insurance can be modeled as special cases in our framework. However, our framework provides greater flexibility in modeling systemic risk. This gives a system manager the ability to much more subtly express risk preferences and can be applied in much broader settings.
Other authors have sought to model the structural mechanisms of interaction between firms in a financial crisis. Such models explicitly describe the contagion of credit events across firms in an economy through different structural mechanisms. For example, Acharya et al. (2010b) and Staum (2011a) consider asset price contagion, while Eisenberg and Noe (2001) , Liu and Staum (2010) , and Cont et al. (2010) consider counterparty contagion. Staum (2011b) provides an excellent survey of the literature on contagion and systemic risk. In this paper, we take as given a collection of outcomes across firms and scenarios of nature. While structural models might be useful in the construction of this input to our framework, we do not explicitly model contagion or other structural mechanisms for systemic risk. In general, our notion of risk attribution assumes that the loss of one firm can be changed without affecting the loss of other firms and does not examine a firm's role in spreading contagion. However, in Example 7 in Section 2, we show how certain aspects of structural models of contagion can be captured in our framework.
Model
We consider a one-period model consisting of a finite set of firms F and a finite set of future scenarios Ω. We define an economy by a matrix X ∈ R |F |×|Ω| . Here, the quantity X i,ω is the loss (or, if negative, the profit) of firm i in scenario ω. We denote by X ω ∈ R |F | the column vector of outcomes in scenario ω across all firms; we refer to this as the cross-sectional profile of losses across firms of the economy X, in scenario ω. In some examples, we assume there is a probability distribution p ∈ R |Ω| + over the space of scenarios Ω. In these cases, we can interprete the matrix X ∈ R |F |×|Ω| as a random vector which has outcome X ω ∈ R |F | with probability p ω .
In the rest of the paper, the following notation is be helpful: the vector 1 Ω ∈ R |Ω| denotes a unit loss of an individual firm in all scenarios, and vector 1 F ∈ R |F | denotes a cross-sectional loss profile in a scenario where each firm has a unit loss, and the matrix 1 E 1 F 1 Ω ∈ R |F |×|Ω| denotes an economy with a unit loss for every firm in every scenario. Similarly, the vectors 0 F ∈ R |F | , 0 Ω ∈ R |Ω| , and the matrix 0 E ∈ R |F |×|Ω| correspond to cases with zero profit or loss for every firm in every scenario. Given an economy X, a cross-sectional loss profile x, and a scenario ω, the matrix (x, X −ω ) ∈ R |F |×|Ω| denotes an economy with loss profile x in scenario ω, but where outcomes in all other scenarios are given by the corresponding columns in X. Inequalities between pairs of vectors and matrices are to be interpreted component-wise.
A systemic risk measure ρ is a summary statistic that quantifies the level of 'risk' associated with an economy X by a single real number ρ(X). Given two economies X and Y , if ρ(X) > ρ(Y ) then we say that X is riskier than Y and thus less preferred. Hence, a systemic risk measure implicitly encodes the preferences of a regulator over the universe of possible economies.
We first review the axiomatic framework for coherent single-firm 1 risk measures 2 commonly used in the literature (Artzner et al., 1999 
(ii) Positive homogeneity: For all non-negative scalars α ≥ 0, ρ(αx) = αρ(x).
In addition, a single-firm risk measure is coherent if it satisfies the following condition (v):
The conditions for a single-firm risk measure can be motivated as follows: The monotonicity condition (i) reflects that, if one firm has greater losses in every scenario than another, it is less preferred. The positive homogeneity condition (ii) requires that the risk increases in proportion to the scale of losses. The convexity condition (iii) asserts that diversification reduces risk, i.e., the risk of a firm diversified between outcomes corresponding to x and y is less than the weighted risk of the component firms x and y. The normalization condition (iv) fixes the multiplicative scaling 4 of the risk measure. The cash invariance condition (v) allows the interpretation of risk as a capital requirement: when a certain loss α is added to the outcome in every scenario, the risk of the firm increases by exactly α.
Building on the definition for a single-firm risk measure, we formally define a systemic risk measure as follows: Definition 2 (Systemic Risk Measure). A systemic risk measure is a function ρ : R |F |×|Ω| → R that satisfies the following conditions, for all economies X, Y, Z ∈ R |F |×|Ω| :
(II) Positive homogeneity: For all non-negative scalars α ≥ 0, ρ(αX) = αρ(X). 1 In this paper, we use the term 'single-firm' risk measure to refer to the risk measures for a single entity, i.e., an entity for which the outcome in every scenario of nature is a single real number. This is in contrast to the systemic risk measures which we will introduce shortly, where there is a vector of outcomes (one for each component of the system) in every scenario of nature. Note that a systemic risk measure could, for example, also be applied in the case of an individual firm, where the 'components' correspond to divisions of the firm that contribute to the overall risk.
2 Our terminology is slightly non-standard here: for example, for single-firm risk measures, Schied (2006) defines a 'monetary measure of risk' as satisfying (i) and (v), a 'convex measure of risk' as satisfying (i) and (iii)-(v), and a 'coherent measure of risk as satisfying (i)- (v) .
3 In what follows, we sometimes consider single-firm risk measures ρ : R |Ω| + → R defined only on the positive orthant. In that case, we assume that conditions (i)-(iv) are satisfied for all x, y ∈ R |Ω| + .
(III) Preference consistency: Define a partial order ρ on cross-sectional profiles as follows: Given cross-sectional profiles x, y ∈ R |F | , we say that
Our definition of a systemic risk measure is justified as follows: conditions (I)-(II) are similar to the corresponding conditions for a single-firm risk measure, and can be justified in a similar manner. The preference consistency condition (III), on the other hand, does not have an analog in the single-firm case. This condition defines an ordering (or, preference relationship) ρ on cross-sectional profiles x, y ∈ R |F | by comparing the systemic risk (according to ρ) of the constant economies 5 x1 Ω and y1 Ω . If x ρ y, we say that y is preferred to x. Preference consistency requires that if cross-sectional profiles in the economies X and Y are such that if, in every scenario ω, Y ω is preferred to X ω , the systemic risk of Y must be consistent with this preference and thus cannot be greater than the systemic risk of X. When the economy consists of a single firm, condition (III) follows from monotonicity.
The preference consistency condition implies independence from irrelevant alternatives (see, e.g., Kreps, 1988) as follows: suppose that x, y ∈ R |F | are cross-sectional loss profiles such that x ρ y, i.e., y is preferred to x. Then, for any economy Z ∈ R |F |×|Ω| and any scenario ω, define (x, Z −ω ) to be the economy where outcomes for firms in scenario ω are given by x, and outcomes in all other scenarios are given by Z, and define (y, Z −ω ) similarly. Preference consistency implies that ρ(x, Z −ω ) ≥ ρ(y, Z −ω ). In other words, if y is preferred to x, then, all else being equal, any economy which realizes y in some scenario is less risky to an economy which realizes x in that scenario, independent of the scenario and of the outcomes in other scenarios. Thus, by imposing the preference consistency axiom, we assume that the systemic risk measure expresses a preference over cross-sectional profiles that is consistent across scenarios. Introducing the preference consistency condition is one of the major contributions of this paper, in that it allows us to extend the single-firm risk measure to a systemic risk measure that captures the interaction of many firms.
Note that our definition of systemic risk does not contain a cash invariance condition, as required by a coherent single-firm risk measure. This is because we want to allow for systemic risk measures derived from deposit insurance that are incompatibile with cash invariance: if all outcomes in the future are reduced by a deterministic amount, this does not necessarily result in a commensurate reduction in the price of deposit insurance.
The convexity conditions (IV-a) and (IV-b) are both concerned with the benefits of diversification. Condition (IV-a), labeled 'outcome convexity', is the usual notion of convexity: when the economy Z is a diversified mixture of two economies X and Y , the risk of Z is no greater than the weighted combination of the risk of economies X and Y . Outcome convexity is concerned with a 'portfolio' of economies X and Y , in that we are allowed to add the outcomes from the two economies and the risk reduction comes from the fact that outcomes X and Y are possibly correlated.
Condition (IV-b) is concerned with convexity as it relates to risk aversion. The context of this condition is as follows. We have two stages of uncertainty. The outcome of the first stage is the economy X with probability α and the economy Y with probability 1 − α. In the second stage, the scenario ω and the firm outcomes corresponding to ω and the economy selected in the first stage Finally, the normalization condition (V) requires the risk of a unit loss by all firms with certainty to be the total loss, i.e., the number of firms |F|. This is simply a convenient choice of scaling and is imposed without loss of generality.
Structural Decomposition
In order to assess the systemic risk of an economy, a regulator is concerned with both the crosssectional profile of losses across firms and the distribution of aggregate outcomes across scenarios.
Thus, in order to define a risk preference over the universe of economies, one might seek to independently express these two types of preferences. We formalize this notion as follows:
Definition 3 (Aggregation Function). A function Λ : R |F | → R over cross-sectional loss profiles of firms is an aggregation function if, for all cross-sectional loss profiles x, y ∈ R |F | , it satisfies:
An aggregation function provides a summary statistic that encapsulates a cross-sectional profile of losses across firms in a single scenario into a real number, thus expressing a preference over such profiles. The conditions (i)-(iv) are analogous to the corresponding conditions for a systemic risk measure, and motivated by similar concerns. Subject to these conditions, the regulator has considerable freedom in specifying preferences over the distribution of losses across firms, and we will see a number of examples of aggregation functions in what follows.
Once the cross-sectional outcomes across firms are aggregated, the evaluation of systemic risk reduces to an evaluation of the profile of aggregated outcomes across scenarios. This can be accomplished by a single-firm risk measure ρ 0 : R |Ω| → R (Definition 1), which we call the base risk measure. The independent choice of an aggregation function and a base risk measure provides a clear way to specify preferences over the universe of economies. The following theorem, whose proof is deferred until Section 2.3, illustrates how these functions can be composed to yield a systemic risk measure, and that, in fact, all systemic risk measures admit such a decomposition. 
Note that for a systemic risk measure ρ the positive homogeneity and the normalization conditions imply that Im ρ is either R or R + . Hence, the two parts in Theorem 1 state that, in all cases, the choice of a systemic risk measure is equivalent to the choice of a base risk measure and an aggregation function.
As shown in Theorem 1, the key ingredient that bridges single-firm risk measures to systemic risk measures is the choice of aggregation function. An aggregation function allows us to measure the risk of aggregate positions as that of a single firm's positions. We emphasize that it is the preference consistency condition in Definition 2 that makes this structural decomposition possible.
In fact, when the other conditions (including monotonicity, positive homogeneity, and convexity) are modified, a similar structural decomposition result continues to hold so long as preference consistency is satisfied. For example, in Section 6, we provide a structural decomposition when the convexity condition is dropped and the positive homogeneity condition is kept; similarly, a structural decomposition can also be constructed if the positive homogeneity condition is dropped and the convexity condition is kept. Simply put, the preference consistency condition connects a reasonable single-firm risk measure to a systemic version, and one has the freedom to choose other appropriate conditions for risk measure.
Applications
We now consider some examples to illustrate how the choice of an aggregation function and a base risk measure describes a systemic risk measure.
Example 1 (Systemic Expected Shortfall).
Consider the aggregation function
This aggregation function defines the aggregate loss of a cross-sectional profile to be the sum of the profits and losses of individual firms. Assume there is a given distribution p ∈ R |Ω|
+ over the space of scenarios Ω, and define 
This systemic risk measure is closely related 6 to the 'systemic expected shortfall' of the economy discussed by Acharya et al. (2010a) . Note that this choice of aggregation function treats losses and gains symmetrically. Further, it allows gains from one firm to cancel with losses of another firm.
This approach might be undesirable if the regulator cannot subsidize the losses of some firms with the profits of others.
Example 2 (Deposit Insurance). Consider the aggregation function
7 (3) Λ loss (x) i∈F x + i , ∀ x ∈ R |F | .
This aggregation function considers only the losses of the firms. Assume there is a given distribution
+ over the space of scenarios Ω, and define the base risk measure to be the expectation
6 Strictly speaking, Acharya et al. (2010a) define a risk measure via preferences over the collection of returns of individual firms, while we express preferences over the losses, in absolute terms, experienced by individual firms. This difference is minor, however, and our risk measures could easily be defined in that setting.
7 Given a scalar z ∈ R, we define z + max(z, 0) to be the positive part of z, and z − max(−z, 0) to be the negative part of z.
Then, we have
In this example, the risk measure is the expected value of total losses only. When the expectation is taken over the risk neutral distribution, ρ(X) equals the price of a 'deposit insurance' contract that pays out the losses of insolvent firms. This is similar in spirit to a number of proposed systemic risk measures (Lehar, 2005; Huang et al., 2009) . Note that the aggregation function Λ loss treats losses and gains asymmetrically, and does not allow the gains of some firms to subsidize losses of other firms.
One feature common to both Examples 1 and 2 is that they are indifferent to how a large loss is spread out across firms in an economy. In particular, the aggregation functions Λ total and Λ loss assign the same aggregate outcome to a cross-sectional profile where one firm losses a lot of money and other firms have zero loss, or a profile where all firms lose an average amount of money. In practice, a regulator may have a preference over two such profiles. Through the design of appropriate aggregation functions, our framework is sufficiently rich to express such preferences. 
Example 3 (Investing with Performance Fees). Consider an investor with investments in a collection of hedge funds indexed by the set F. Here, given a loss profile x ∈ R |F | , we interpret x i as the gross loss incurred by the investor due to the investment in the hedge fund i. Consider the following two cases: (a) the investor is a direct investor in the individual hedge funds; (b) the investor is indirectly invested in the individual
(4) Λ HF (x) i∈F x i + γ i x − i , ∀ x ∈ R |F | .
In case (b), the fund-of-funds investor can do so via the aggregation function
(5) Λ FoF (x) i∈F x i + γ i x − i + γ i∈F x i + γ i x − i − , ∀ x ∈ R |F | .
These aggregation functions consider the total profit or loss across all funds to the investor, net of all performance fees.
In the above example, we measure the systemic risk from a portfolio management viewpoint of an investor. Here, because of performance fees, losses and gains must be treated asymmetrically.
Moreover, dispersion risk is important: holding the gross profit i∈F x i fixed, the investor prefers to eschew profiles where the individual fund outcomes {x i } are dispersed, and the investor pays fees to the positively performing funds, but does not recover fees from the negatively performing funds. With modifications, more complicated performance fee structures or tax schemes imposed on profits can be captured by a similar aggregation functions. In these examples, the choice of the base risk measure is left up to the investor.
In the following examples, we illustrate systemic risk measures that are not restricted to financial applications. For complex systems with many interacting components, we can often design systemic risk measures with specialized structure appropriate for the application at hand. The examples we consider involve aggregation functions that are special cases of the following general class:
for all loss profiles x ∈ R |F | . If we assume that, for example, 
Here, each decision variable f (u,v) represents the required reduction of flow along the link (u, v In previous examples, we have viewed outcomes across firms and scenarios of nature as exogenously specified and did not consider structural mechanisms by which the loss of one firm can create losses at other firms, i.e., contagion. The following example illustrates that it is possible to introduce mechanisms for contagion, through the careful definition of the value function. 
We interpret x as losses external to the obligations the firms have to each other. The loss 
Proof of Theorem 1
The two parts in this theorem have essentially one proof with minor differences. First, suppose that ρ is a systemic risk measure. For each loss profile x ∈ R |F | , define
In other words, Λ computes the systemic risk of a constant economy represented by x. The monotonicity, convexity and positive homogeneity of Λ holds due to the monotonicity, convexity, and positive homogeneity of ρ. Also, Λ 1 F = |F|, since ρ 1 E ) = |F|. Let Q Im(Λ) be the image of Λ. We know |F| ∈ Q. By the positive homogeneity of Λ, we conclude that R + ⊂ Q. Suppose there exists an economy X such that ρ(X) < 0. We can find a vector x ∈ R |F | such that x1 Ω ≤ X. So
By the positive homogeneity of Λ, we conclude that R − ⊂ Q. Thus,
where X is an economy that satisfies
First, we show ρ 0 is well-defined. Suppose two economies X, Y have that
Since ρ has preference consistency across scenarios, we have that
Thus, we conclude that ρ(X) = ρ(Y ), and ρ 0 is well-defined. Clearly, ρ 0 is monotonic and positively homogeneous, from the monotonicity and positive homogeneity of Λ and ρ. We show that ρ 0 is convex. For two vectors x, y ∈ Q Ω , given a scalar 0
Then, for all scenarios ω ∈ Ω,
From the risk convexity of ρ, we have that
This establishes the convexity of ρ 0 . In addition,
It follows that ρ 0 (1 Ω ) = 1. For part (i), −1 ∈ Q, we can show ρ 0 (−1 Ω ) = −1 similarly. Now, we can show that for part (i), for a scalar α ∈ R, by the sub-additivity (as a result of convexity and positive homogeneity) of ρ 0 , we have that
Hence, ρ 0 has the cash invariance property ρ 0 (x + α1 Ω ) = ρ 0 (x) + α for part (i).
To summarize, for part (i), we have shown that ρ 0 is a coherent single-firm risk measure; for part (ii), we have shown that ρ 0 is a single-firm risk measure. From the definition of Λ and ρ 0 , we have the structural decomposition,
For the converse of the theorem, suppose that Λ is an aggregation function and ρ 0 is a base risk measure. Since Λ and ρ 0 are monotonic, convex and positively homogeneous, it is clear that ρ has the properties of monotonicity, convexity and positive homogeneity. The normalization condition is due to that of Λ and the fact that ρ 0 (1 Ω ) = 1. To show the preference consistency of ρ, consider two economies X, Y ∈ R |F |×|Ω| where, in every scenario ω ∈ Ω,
By the monotonicity of ρ 0 , we have
Then, by using the monotonicity of ρ 0 again, we conclude that
Now, we show the risk convexity of ρ. For any three economies X, Y, Z ∈ R |F |×|Ω| and any scalar 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, suppose for all scenarios ω ∈ Ω,
We know that for part (i), we have that ρ 0 (±1 Ω ) = ±1, and for part (ii), we have ρ 0 (1 Ω ) = 1.
Thus, we can simplify the above equation, for both part (i) and part (ii), as
Using the convexity of ρ 0 , we conclude that, for all scenarios ω ∈ Ω,
In addition, for part (i), there exists a vector x ∈ R |F | such that Λ(x) < 0. So we have ρ(x1 Ω ) = Λ(x) < 0 and ρ 1 E ) = |F| > 0. By positive homogeneity of ρ, we conclude that Im ρ = R. For part (ii), Λ(x) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ R |F | . So ρ(X) ≥ ρ 0 (0 E ) = 0, for all X ∈ R |F |×|Ω| . We also know ρ 1 E ) = |F| > 0. By positive homogeneity of ρ, we conclude that Im ρ = R + .
Variational Representations
In this section, we develop two variational representations for systemic risk measures. In Section 3.1, we introduce a primal representation, where the systemic risk is the value of an optimization problem over a set of 'acceptable' economies. In Section 3.2, we develop a dual representation, where the systemic risk is the worst-case scaled expected loss across the economy. The dual representation provides a 'shadow price ' to capture the systemic risk externality of the decision making of individual firms. This suggests a decentralized framework for systemic risk based decision-making that is further explored in Section 5.
Acceptance Sets and Primal Representation
For the case of coherent single-firm risk measures, Artzner et al. (1999) describe a representation for the risk as the minimum quantity of cash that needs to be injected into the each scenario such that the collection of outcomes is contained in a set of 'acceptable' outcomes. Motivated by this, we wish to construct a similar primal representation for systemic risk measures. In order to do this, we need the following definition.
Definition 4 (Acceptance Set). Consider a finite set of entities N . An acceptance set over N is a set S ⊂ R × R |N | , that is a non-empty closed convex cone, and that satisfies:
(i) Monotonicity: If (m, x 1 ) ∈ S, x 2 ∈ R |N | , and
(ii) Epigraph property: If (m 1 , x) ∈ S, m 2 ∈ R, and m 2 ≥ m 1 , then (m 2 , x) ∈ S.
We take the set of entities N in Definition 4 either to be the collection of firms F or scenarios Ω.
In the former case, when N = F, (m, x) ∈ R × R |F | is contained in the acceptance set if the crosssectional profile x is considered acceptable at a given level of 'risk exposure' m. The monotonicity property suggests that, at a fixed level of risk exposure, loss profiles that are dominated by an acceptable profile are also acceptable. The epigraph property suggests that if a loss profile is acceptable at a certain level of risk exposure, it is also acceptable at higher levels of risk exposure.
Similarly, when N = Ω, the acceptance set captures sets of risk exposures across scenarios, in addition to an overall risk measure, such that the per scenario risk exposures are acceptable relative to the overall risk measure. The properties of acceptance sets follow from the underlying properties of aggregation functions and base risk measures; in fact, we will shortly see that acceptance sets are epigraphs of these objects. Note that, relative to the case considered by Artzner et al. (1999) , we require an additional dimension corresponding to the level of risk exposure of the regulator.
If a cash invariance assumption held as in Artzner et al. (1999) , this extra dimension could be eliminated, but in the present context it is necessary.
The following theorem provides a primal representation to a systemic risk measure, as the value of an optimization problem over a feasible set defined through acceptable sets: 
Further, if ρ is characterized by a base risk measure ρ 0 and an aggregation function Λ, i.e., ρ = ρ 0 • Λ, then the acceptance sets can be taken as the epigraphs of ρ 0 and Λ, i.e.,
Proof. Given ρ, by Theorem 1 a base risk measure ρ 0 and an aggregation function Λ exist such that ρ = ρ 0 • Λ. Define A and B to be their epigraphs through (11). From the properties of ρ 0 and Λ, it is clear that these are acceptance sets.
Moreover, we have the epigraph representations
for all ∈ R |Ω| , x ∈ R |F | . Using the fact that ρ = ρ 0 • Λ, and the epigraph representation of ρ 0 , we have for all X ∈ R |F |×|Ω| ,
Using the fact that A is monotonic, and applying the epigraph representation of Λ, the result follows.
The primal program (10) is easily interpreted: the vector of decision variables defines the regulator's minimal risk exposure in each scenario given the corresponding cross-sectional loss profile, while the scalar decision variable m is overall systemic risk given the vector of risk exposures across scenarios.
Dual Representation
In this section, we define a dual representation for systemic risk measures. This variational representation provides an alternative way to compute systemic risk measures and an alternative interpretation of their meaning. Moreover, it provides certain computational and operational advantages. In Section 4, we show that the dual representation also provides the basis of a risk attribution rule.
To begin, suppose ρ = ρ 0 • Λ is a systemic risk measure. As in Theorem 2, take the epigraphs of ρ 0 and Λ as the acceptance sets A and B, respectively. Define
Up to a sign change, A * and B * are the dual cones to A and B, respectively. Then, the following theorem, whose full proof can be found in the Online Supplement, holds. 
In addition, feasible points (π, Ξ) for this problem must satisfy
In order to interpret the dual problem (14), observe that (15) implies that, for feasible (π, Ξ), π is a sub-stochastic vector. This can be interpreted as a probability distribution over an the augmented set of scenarios Ω ∪ {ω 0 }, where ω 0 is an additional, artificial scenario in which every firm has a 0 outcome. Define the matrixΞ ∈ R |F |×|Ω| bŷ
for each firm i and scenario ω. Then, the objective in (14) becomes
where (15) implies thatΞ
In other words, the dual objective is the worst-case expected loss, over some set of feasible probability distributionsπ and scaling functionsΞ, of a scaled economy in which the participation of the |F| firms in the economy in scenario ω is rescaled according to the vectorΞ 1,ω , . . . ,Ξ |F |,ω . This is analogous to the robust interpretation of a single-firm coherent risk measure as a worst-case expected loss.
The following is an immediate corollary of Theorem 3:
Corollary 1. Suppose that ρ is a systemic risk measure with dual representation (14)
. Given an economy X, if (π * , Ξ * ) is a dual optimal solution, then Ξ * is a subgradient of ρ at X.
Corollary 1 suggests another interpretation of the optimal dual solution Ξ * for an economy X.
The quantity Ξ * i,ω is the minimal marginal increase in systemic risk as function of a marginal increase in the losses of firm i in scenario ω. In other words, Ξ * i,ω captures the externalities imposed by the decision-making of a firm on the system regulator, and hence is a shadow price for systemic risk.
Note that these shadow prices can vary both by scenario -incremental losses in some scenarios may have a much larger impact than in other scenarios -and by the identity of the firm. These shadow prices could be used to coordinate decision-making by individual firms with the goals of the regulator. For example, it is be possible to design tax schemes based on these prices, in the spirit of Acharya et al. (2010a) , such that individual firms optimize their portfolios to distribute profits and losses across scenarios in a way that is aligned with the concerns of the regulator. We will revisit this topic in Section 5.
The dual optimization problem (14) may also lead to useful decentralized schemes for the computing systemic risk. Here, a centralized regulator can seek to choose optimal values for the dual variables (π, Ξ), while relying on constituent firms to compute their individual weighted profits and losses, scaled according to each putative choice of dual variables. The utility of the dual representation from analytical, operational, and computational perspectives is illustrated by the following examples.
Example 8 (Total P&L). Consider the total profit and loss aggregation function Λ total , defined by (1). For this aggregation function, it is easy to see that
Then, the dual representation (14) takes the simplified form
In Example 8, the base risk measure (and thus the constraint set A * ) has not been specified.
However, independent of this choice, the shadow price for systemic risk for each firm i in a scenario ω is given by the optimal dual variableπ * ω and is independent of the identity of the firm. This is consistent with the choice of aggregation function: the impact of a marginal increase in the loss of any firm is the same, since the sum total of all profits and losses is of concern.
Example 9 (Total Loss). Consider the total loss aggregation function Λ loss , defined by (3). Then, we have that
B * = ξ 0 ,ξ ∈ R × R |F | : 0 F ≤ξ ≤ ξ 0 1 F .
Thus, the dual representation (14) takes the simplified form
In Example 9, the shadow price for systemic risk for firm i in scenario ω is given by the optimal dual variableπ * ω if X i,ω ≥ 0, and is 0 otherwise. This is because a firm can only marginally impact the systemic risk in scenarios where it is not profitable.
Example 10 (CVaR). Suppose, given 0 < α < 1, the aggregation function is taken to be
This corresponds to the aggregate total profits and losses of the worst α-percentile of firms in the cross-sectional profile, i.e., it is analogous to the CVaR α risk measure of (2), but taken across firms rather than scenarios. Then, we have that
In Example 10, the shadow price for systemic risk Ξ * i,ω , in general, also depends both on the identity of the firm i and the particular scenario ω.
Risk Attribution
In this section, we consider the problem of attributing or allocating the systemic risk across the firms that compose the economy. The spirit here is to identify systemically risky institutions, and quantify their overall impact on the risk in the economy. Motivated by the discussion of shadow prices in Section 3.2, consider the following definition:
Definition 5 (Risk Attribution). Suppose ρ is a systemic risk measure, with dual decomposition (14).
For each economy X ∈ R |F |×|Ω| , define M(X) ⊂ R |F |×|Ω| to be the set of dual optimal solutions for ρ(X). Given a shadow price for systemic risk Ξ * ∈ M(X), we define a vector y * (X, Ξ * ) ∈ R |F | , with component
as the systemic risk attributable to firm i. We define set of all attribution vectors
Note that the attribution rule is unique if the dual optimal solution for ρ(X) is unique at X.
This definition allocates systemic risk to each firm according its entire profile of profits and losses across scenarios, where each profit or loss is valued according to the appropriate shadow price for systemic risk. Note that the risk allocation is an immediate by-product of the dual representation, and hence requires no computation if the dual solution is available.
The allocation of Definition 5 has a number of desirable properties. First, since Theorem 3 guarantees that the dual optimum equals ρ(X), it is immediate that
In order words, the individual risk attributions add up to the total systemic risk. Second, following Corollary 1, the sensitivity of the attribution y i of firm i to a change in the loss X i,ω in some scenario ω is precisely the shadow price for systemic risk. Hence, the local incentives created by this allocation are aligned with the systemic risk objective. Finally, the risk attribution that we propose has the following fairness property:
Theorem 4. Fix a systemic risk measure ρ. Let X ∈ R |F |×|Ω| denote a given economy. For a vector α ∈ R F + , define r(α) to be the systemic risk associated with an economy α * X that has outcomes for firm i in scenario ω given by α i X i,ω . Then, for any risk attribution y * ∈ Y, α y * ≤ r(α).
Proof. From the dual representation in Theorem 3, we have that
Suppose y * is obtained by a dual optimal solution Ξ * . Since Ξ * is a feasible solution of the dual representation of ρ(X) in (14), Ξ * is also a feasible solution of the dual representation of r(α) in (16), for any α. The objective value achieved by Ξ * in (16) is α y * , which can be no greater than the optimal value r(α), i.e., α y * ≤ r(α).
Theorem 4 is a 'no-undercut' result, in the spirit of Denault (2001) . Here, r(α) is the systemic risk associated with an economy where each firm i participates proportionally to the factor α i ≥ 0.
The result states that, if a fractional coalition of firms specified by the vector α form a new economy α * X, the systemic risk of that economy r(α) ρ(α * X) is at least as large as the weighted sum of risk attributed to the firms in the original economy. Thus, the risk attribution is fair: the risk attributed to any fractional coalition is no greater than it would incur as a standalone economy.
The risk attribution we propose is closely related to prices of Aumann and Shapley (1974) for allocating the cost in a fractional coalition game. If we assume that r is differentiable at the point α = 1 F , then by positive homogeneity, it is differentiable on the ray {t1 F : t ≥ 0}. The Aumann-Shapley prices are then defined by
The last equality follows from the fact that r is positively homogeneous, and is sometimes referred to as the Euler allocation rule or gradient allocation rule (Denault, 2001; Buch and Dorfleitner, 2008) . In fact, when these latter attribution rules are well-defined, they correspond with our notion of risk allocation:
Theorem 5. Given a systemic risk measure ρ and an economy X ∈ R |F |×|Ω| , if ρ is differentiable at X, then the risk attribution y * is unique and coincides with the Aumann-Shapley prices y AS .
Proof. Under the hypothesis, r(α) defined in Theorem 4 is differentiable at α = 1 F . Observing that the constraint set in (16) is compact, we can applying Danskin's theorem (Bertsekas, 1999) to
for all firms i , where Ξ * ∈ R |F |×|Ω| is the unique dual optimal solution for ρ(X). Therefore,
Note that the work of Denault (2001), Fischer (2003) , and Buch and Dorfleitner (2008) suggests the gradient allocation rule for risk attribution in a portfolio setting; that setting is a special case of systemic risk measure corresponding to the total P&L aggregation function Λ total of (1). In that case, the gradient allocation rule is identical to our dual risk attribution y * . Our dual risk attribution y * , however, requires no differentiability assumption, and can apply to a more general class of aggregation functions. When ρ is not differentiable at X, several attribution rules y * are possible and how to choose among them may require further investigation. Related discussion on risk attribution can be found in the work of Tsanakas (2009) and Cherny and Orlov (2011) .
Decentralized Implementation
In this section, we explore the decentralization of systemic risk management. In particular, we establish that the dual representation of Section 3 and the risk attribution rule of Section 4 provide the basis of a tax scheme for internalizing the systemic risk into the decisions of individual firms.
To this end, for each firm i ∈ F, let T (i) ⊂ R |Ω| denote the feasible set of possible outcomes for firm i over the set of scenarios Ω. Denote by
resulting set of possible economies. Let U i : T (i) → R denote the utility function of firm i. We assume that U i is concave and differentiable. Given a systemic risk measure ρ : R |F |×|Ω| → R, we make the following definition:
Definition 6 (Social Optimality). An economyX = X (1) ;X (2) ; . . . ;X (|F |) ∈ T is socially optimal if it maximizes risk-adjusted welfare according to the optimization problem
Here, τ > 0 is a parameter that captures the impact of the systemic risk externality.
A regulator or central planner wishes to drive individual firms to make decisions so that, collectively, these decisions results in a socially optimal economy. However, the regulator is not able to directly control the outcomes of each firm; it is only able to influence investment decisions indirectly via incentives. In particular, suppose the regulator imposes a tax t i (X (i) ) on firm i given outcomes
The firm would then choose outcomes so as to optimize its tax-adjusted utility, i.e., it would solve the optimization problem maximize
Motivated by the dual representation of Section 3 and the risk attribution rule of Section 4, the following theorem suggests a taxation scheme to implement any socially optimal economy:
Theorem 6. Suppose thatX ∈ T is a socially optimal economy. There exists Ξ * ∈ R |F |×|Ω| that is an optimal solution to the dual problem (14) for the systemic risk ρ(X) so that if we define, for each firm i, the tax function
Proof. SinceX is a socially optimal economy, first order conditions for optimality for (17) imply that there must be a subgradient Ξ * ∈ R |F |×|Ω| of ρ atX so that
i∈F ω∈Ω
for all X ∈ T . Any subgradient Ξ * is clearly a dual optimal solution to (14), according to Danskin's theorem (Bertsekas, 1999) . Now, given i ∈ F, we can take X (j) =X (j) for all j = i in (19). We obtain that, for all i ∈ F,
for all X (i) ∈ T (i) . Note that (20) is the first order optimality condition for (18), and thusX (i) is an optimal solution to (18).
Theorem 6 demonstrates that the objective of the regulator can be aligned with the incentives of individual firms through taxation schemes. As suggested by Corollary 1 in Section 3.2, an appropriate tax matrix Ξ * can be easily derived from the dual representation of ρ. Moreover, the tax paid by each firm is (up to the constant τ ) determined by the risk attribution of that firm, c.f.
Definition 5.
Theorem 6 also implies that a subgradient method (e.g., Bertsekas, 1999) applied to the social welfare function would provide an iterative and decentralized approach to search for the optimal economyX in a decentralized manner. When ρ is Lipschitz continuously differentiable, for example, the proximal gradient method is guaranteed to converge to within an absolute error of the optimal in O(1/ ) iterations, each of which can be implemented in a decentralized fashion.
Homogeneous Systemic Risk Functions
In this section, we extend our analysis to value-at-risk-like measures that are monotonic, positively homogeneous but non-convex. Value-at-risk (VaR) (see, e.g., Jorion, 2006 ) is a single-firm risk measure of particular importance, because it is extensively used in the practice of financial risk The VaR at a confidence level α ∈ (0, 1) is defined as follows: suppose x ∈ R |Ω| is a vector of losses across scenarios Ω, and that p ∈ R |Ω| + with 1 Ω p = 1 is a probability distribution over Ω. Then, the VaR of the random loss x is the minimum loss threshold value such that the probability of the loss exceeding is at most 1 − α, i.e.,
ω∈Ω: xω>
From the definition of VaR, it is clear that this risk measure is positively homogeneous, monotonic, normalized, and cash invariant, i.e., it satisfies conditions (i), (ii), (iv), and (v) of Definition 1.
However, it is not convex.
The lack of convexity is the principal difference between homogeneous risk measures and the (convex) risk measures defined in Section 2. Aside from their wide use in practice, homogeneous risk measures have also generated some interest in the literature (e.g., Kou et al., 2009; CerreiaVioglio et al., 2010) . Our goal here is to illustrate the impact of the absence of this axiom on our framework for systemic risk.
In what follows, we investigate the impact of dropping the convexity requirement for systemic risk measures. In Section 6.1, we give a complete structural decomposition for homogeneous risk measures. The benefit from this analysis is two-fold. First, as in the case with convex systemic risk measures discussed in the previous sections, the characterization gives us a rule for constructing homogeneous systemic risk measures from a homogeneous base risk measure and homogeneous aggregation functions. The second and equally important benefit is that the characterization elucidates the implicit assumptions that are being made when one combines single-firm homogeneous risk measures to create a systemic risk measure. As a by-product of our characterization, in Section 6.2 we show that a homogeneous systemic measures have a convex representation. Finally, in Section 6.4 we consider some examples of homogeneous systemic risk measures.
Structural Decomposition
Motivated by the discussion above, we define homogeneous systemic risk measures as follows:
Definition 7 (Homogeneous Systemic Risk Measure). A homogeneous systemic risk measure is a function ρ : R |F |×|Ω| → R that satisfies the following conditions, for all economies X, Y ∈ R |F |×|Ω| :
(II) Positive homogeneity: For all α ≥ 0 and ρ(αX) = αρ(X).
We define homogeneous single-firm risk measures and homogeneous aggregation functions as follows: 
(iii) Normalization: ρ 1 Ω ) = 1.
Definition 9 (Homogeneous Aggregation Function). A function Λ : R |F | → R over cross-sectional loss profiles of firms is a homogeneous aggregation function if, for all cross-sectional loss profiles
x, y ∈ R |F | , it satisfies:
(ii) Positive homogeneity: For all α ≥ 0, Λ(αx) = αΛ(x).
(iii) Normalization: Λ 1 F = |F|.
9 As was the case with Definition 1, we sometimes consider homogeneous single-firm risk measures ρ : R |Ω| + → R defined only on the positive orthant. In that case, we assume that conditions (i)-(ii) are satisfied for all x, y ∈ R 
Proof. The proof is a simplified version of the proof of Theorem 1, since, in this case, it is not necessary to establish convexity. It is thus omitted.
Observe that, comparing Theorem 1 and Theorem 7, preference consistency condition (III) is key to establishing this structural decomposition. The other conditions, namely homogeneity and monotonicity, imply these same properties for the single-firm risk measure ρ 0 and the aggregation function Λ.
Convex Representation
In this section, we develop a convex representation for homogeneous (non-convex) systemic risk measures as the pointwise minima of a collection of convex risk functions. To begin, consider the following lemma, a proof of which that follows the argument of Castellani (2000) 
The following is a corollary of Lemma 1. It establishes a representation for homogeneous systemic risk measures in terms of convex single-firm risk measures and aggregation functions. Proof. The result follows by first applying Theorem 7 to obtain the representation ρ = ρ 0 • Λ in terms of a homogeneous single-firm base risk measure ρ 0 and a homogeneous aggregation function Λ, and then applying Lemma 1 to ρ 0 and Λ.
As an example of this construction, consider the following:
Example 11 (VaR) . Define the single-firm base measure ρ 0 (x) = VaR α (x) to be the value-at-risk defined in (21), given a uniform probability distribution p 1 Ω /|Ω| and a confidence level α ∈ (0, 1). 
In this case, we have that
where, for each P ∈ T ,
is a convex base risk measure.
Risk Attribution
Next, we discuss the issue of attributing the total risk ρ(X) across the |F| firms in the economy.
We show below that a good risk attribution rule exists for a subset of homogeneous systemic risk measures that includes VaR.
For a systemic risk measure ρ, an economy X, and a vector α ∈ R |F | + , define r ρ (α) ρ(α * X), where α * X is defined by setting the outcomes for firm i in scenario ω to α i X i,ω . In this setting, a risk allocation function Ψ |F | takes as inputs two arguments, namely the function r ρ : R |F | + → R and a vector of fractional participation α ∈ R |F | + , and returns a risk allocation to each firm. The following are certain desirable properties for Ψ that are typically assumed in the literature. Suppose we have any two systemic risk measures ρ 1 and ρ 2 .
Example 12 (VaR) . Consider the aggregation function Λ total (x) 1 F x of (1) Kou et al. (2009) 
Future Directions
There are a number of exciting directions for future research that are worth mentioning:
One important issue is understanding how mergers or spin-offs in the economy affect the systemic risk. In the case where the aggregation function is the sum of profits or losses of individual firms, the systemic risk does not change when firms choose to combine or subdivide. However, with general aggregation functions, the systemic risk measure may change. A related point is understanding how best a regulator can express preferences for how losses should be distributed across the economy.
Is it better to have a single firm lose a large some of money, or have a loss equally divided amongst many firms? Existing systemic risk measures are largely indifferent between these two cases, while a regulator may not be. Our framework is sufficiently expressive to allow systemic risk measures that express such preferences.
Another direction is related to the issue of firms which are 'too-big-to-fail'. In this paper, we primarily considered positively homogeneous risk measures, which penalize the scale of losses linearly. One might alternatively consider super-linear systemic risk measures, which assign increasing marginal risk to the scale of an economy. Such systemic risk measures could be defined by considering a set of axioms which include convexity but not positive homogeneity. As was the case in Section 6, so long as the preference consistency assumption holds, similar theoretical results could be developed, including a structural decomposition and a dual representation. Such super-linear convex systemic risk measures could be used to discourage firms from establishing positions that render them too-big-to-fail.
Issues related to the strategic behavior of firms with respect to systemic risk measures are also worth consideration. This topic would be of great importance, for example, if a regulator wanted to implement a tax scheme according the risk attribution of a systemic risk measure.
Online Supplement to "An Axiomatic Approach To
Systemic Risk" for all x ∈ R n .
Proof. This proof closely follows the argument presented by Castellani (2000) . Let S {x ∈ R n :
x 2 = 1} denote the unit sphere in R n . For s ∈ S, define
where K s {λs : λ ≥ 0} denotes the cone generated by s ∈ S, and K Since S is a compact set, for any x ∈ R n , inf s∈S g (s) (x) is achieved, i.e., the infimum is, in fact, a minimum. Moreover, where the second equality follows from the fact that g is monotonically increasing and β ≥ 0.
